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Pragmatism, Social Democracy, and
the Politics of Democratic
Association
Ed Quish
1 Roberto Frega’s Pragmatism and the Wide View of Democracy makes a powerful case that
we should understand democracy expansively, not simply as a political regime, but as a
comprehensive  social  formation  that  shapes  ordinary  interactions  at  their  deepest
level. Properly understood, democracy does not just apply to formal institutions that
translate popular preferences into political outcomes, but defines an entire way of life
based  on  the  ideal  of  free  and  equal  association.  Frega  argues  that  while  this
democratic way of life began to emerge alongside “the twin political revolutions that
took place on the two sides of the Atlantic Sea at the end of the eighteenth century,” its
promise remains unfulfilled (2019: 1). Today, in the midst of a legitimation crisis for
contemporary  liberal  democracies,  Frega  argues  that  his  “wide,”  “social,”  and
“pragmatist” conception of democracy is simultaneously more capacious and trenchant
than prevailing liberal theories. He claims that “to renew the democratic project it is
not  enough either  to  call  for  the reinforcement of  its  liberal  protections –  notably
against  populist  threats,  or  to  revitalize  participatory  mechanisms,  as  many  left
intellectuals contend. In a more encompassing way, what needs to be done is to plunge
deeper into its social roots” (2019: 7). Plunging into democracy’s social roots requires a
theory that clarifies the meaning of democratic sociality, explaining how democratic
self-organization  can  re-shape  our  societies  according  to  the  free  association  of  a
society of equals. 
2 While theories of social democracy have often been structured by debates about the
politics  and  political  economy  of  the  welfare  state  or  the  dilemmas  of  the
parliamentary  road  to  socialism,1 Frega’s  position  is  noteworthy  for  its  specifically
social emphasis on the texture of relationships in ordinary interaction, an analytical
focus that is meant to encompass “the political as well as the economic and the moral
dimensions of associated living” (2019: 17). Accordingly, Frega defines democracy not
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as a form of government or as a political-economic regime, but as a form of social
interconnection: as “a social unit capable of promoting individual happiness and self-
realization  by  fostering  relations  of  mutual  cooperation  among  free  and  equal
individuals”  (ibid.:  2).  Frega’s  associational  focus  does  not  displace  many  of  the
traditional  political  and economic concerns of  social  democratic  politics  –  reducing
inequality,  facilitating  political  participation,  democratizing  the  workplace,  among
others – but instead reframes their significance by emphasizing processes that render
social interaction more egalitarian, inclusive, and fulfilling. Still, Frega’s associational
focus does imply an analytical shift away from the dynamics of political conflict and the
challenges  of  economic  transformation,  re-orienting  democratic  theory  toward  the
dynamics  of  democratic  habit-formation  and  social  structuration.  Guided  by  the
normative  standards  of  “(a)  relational  parity,  (b)  inclusive  authority,  and (c)  social
involvement,” Frega’s ambition is to provide a theory of association that can serve as a
benchmark to evaluate the democratic character of any social group (ibid.: 8). 
3 While Frega’s normative ambitions are often compelling and his associational emphasis
leads to a series of important insights, his conception of social democracy stands to
benefit from being widened further, specifically in order to integrate the dynamics of
political economy and political  conflict into his interactionist social  theory. Further
expansion along these lines seems promising within Frega’s  theoretical  parameters,
since it can enrich his account of democratic association rather than do what he clearly
intends to avoid – namely, place a structuralist or methodological individualist theory
of political economy or a theory of foundational antagonism at the basis of his social
ontology. 
4 To  elaborate  on  these  suggestions,  I  will  explore  a  series  of  limitations  in  Frega’s
argument  that  result  from  insufficient  attention  to  political  economy  and  political
conflict.  These limitations manifest  in  the book’s  historical  argument,  its  theory of
relational equality, and its reliance on an overly voluntarist understanding of political
change. While Frega’s desire to ground his theory of social democracy within a general
history  of  democratic  modernity  is  admirable,  his  claim  that  the  persistence  of
aristocratic  forms  of  hierarchy  and  social  seclusion  represents  social  democracy’s
major  antagonist  sidelines  the  conflict  between  capitalism  and  social  democracy,
allowing too many difficult questions to be avoided. Second, and relatedly, I try to show
how the limits of this historical framing have consequences for the book’s normative
theory of association, specifically the vision of relational equality that underpins it.
And finally,  I  offer  a  sympathetic  critique  of  how Frega  envisages  the  relationship
between social and political democracy. Here, I attempt to show that progress for social
democracy  requires  combining  the  voluntary,  associational  impulse  that  defines
American  pragmatism  with  an  acknowledgement  that  democratization  requires




5 Rather  than  place  a  free-standing  normative  ideal  at  the  core  of  his  account  of
democracy,  Frega  develops  his  theory  of  democracy  by  reconstructing  a  series  of
normative  practices  that  have  underpinned  the  social  evolutions  of  democratic
modernity.  Given  the  centrality  of  historical  reconstruction  for  the  book’s
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methodology, the nature of Frega’s historical narrative has deep importance for his
overall theory. Frega’s wide view of democracy is rooted in an expansive assessment of
the  consequences  of  the age  of  democratic  revolutions.  According  to  Frega,  these
democratic revolutions created more than new political institutions, but “a complex
socio-cultural-ideological-organizational-economic  syndrome,  something  that  is  well
captured by Claude Lefort’s definition of democracy as a ‘form of society’ or, in Marcel
Mauss’s terminology, as a ‘total social fact’” (Frega 2019: 7).  Following Lefort, Frega
claims that the basis of democracy’s social  revolution was the transformation of an
aristocratic society of orders into a society of equals integrated by their own voluntary
association. As Frega puts it, “The idea that free and equal individuals could associate
freely was profoundly new, unsettling, and contested. To be achieved it required the
invention from scratch of a new form of society, one in which social cooperation would
be achieved through voluntary association among free and equals rather than through
integration  through  the  traditional  mechanisms  of  rank,  privilege,  and  hierarchy”
(2019: 108). The book’s central argument is built around the unfulfilled potential that
Frega sees in this ideal, stressing how it remains both theoretically under-clarified and
practically unrealized. 
6 While we might interpret the meaning of these transformations differently depending
on how we understand the meaning of  “voluntary,” “free,” and “equal” – they can
indicate an individualistic, liberal vision of society bound by contracts as much as a
social  democratic  vision  of  cooperation  premised  on  solidarity  –  Frega  paints  a
compelling  picture  of  what  he  believes  the  democratic  ideal  of  free  association
demands. He claims that it requires, “the removal of all the social, cultural, economic,
educational, and political obstacles which hinder the realization of a society of equals
in all dimensions of social life, that is, in the family, the workplace, education, the civil
sphere, and access to political positions. This form of social equality can be achieved
only if formal as well as informal conditions of access to symbolic, cultural, social, and
material goods are equally distributed with no considerations of status” (ibid.: 52). In
other words, democracy implies that relational equality should structure all forms of
social  interconnection,  allowing maximal opportunities for individuals to access the
benefits  of  the  society  to  which  they  contribute  and  to  experience  self-fulfillment
through social cooperation. 
7 Since these aspirations remain substantially unfulfilled, there must be obstacles that
have impeded and continue to impede their progressive realization. In Frega’s view,
these obstacles are external to the idea of a democratic society that began to emerge in
the age of revolutions: they derive from the durability of pre-democratic systems of
status  and  rank  that  impede  free  association,  obstacles  that  he  describes  as  “the
persistence  of  the  ancien  régime”  (ibid.:  107).  Stressing  how  quasi-aristocratic
arrangements and social ideals continued to structure democratic modernity well into
the 20th century can be illuminating, and there is a tradition of democratic critiques of
the rise of new “aristocracies” within labor and social democratic circles throughout
the 19th century that Frega’s account can draw upon. At the same time, claiming that
social democracy’s main adversary is the persistence of the ancien régime does not
bring into focus how capitalism has impeded free association, often under the guise of
preserving voluntarism, freedom, and equality. At both the practical and theoretical
level,  these  obstacles  are  not  external  to  the  social  formations  created in  the  18th
century revolutions, but an immanent part of their forms of politics and social relation.
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8 Both American pragmatism and its contemporary democratic movements reflected the
critical potential and the limitations of the opposition between democratic equality and
aristocratic privilege that shapes Frega’s historical narrative. In John Dewey’s earliest
writings on democracy, he echoed Frega’s claims, lamenting how an “aristocratic ideal”
premised on the use of political power for “the assertion of privilege and status and to
the detriment of the common good” continued to shape political theory and practice
well into the late 19th century (Dewey 1969: 242). Dewey was not alone in adopting this
critical  frame.  Under  the  banner  of  republicanism,  contemporary  American  labor
organizations  like  the  Knights  of  Labor  polemicized  against  their  slavery  to  an
“industrial  aristocracy”  as  they  agitated  for  a  cooperative  form  of  industrial
democracy.2 Yet moving into the twentieth century, both Dewey and organized labor
sharpened their critique.  Labor began to see its antagonism with capital  not as the
result  of  special,  quasi-aristocratic privileges,  but as an immanent part of  capitalist
society’s  self-reproduction.  These  realizations  emerged  from  a  straightforward
learning process. The capitalists who fought to undermine labor’s organizations did not
have any formal status-superiority to the workers who they dominated. Instead, their
power  over  labor  was  rooted  in  their  ownership  of  capital,  protected  as  a  generic
property right that any citizen had a formally equal right to enforce. Even as a panoply
of  arguments  circulated  about  how  to  ease  or  resolve  that  antagonism,  a  candid
acknowledgement  of  its  formative  social  power  was  at  the  root  of  their  social
diagnoses.3 In other words, rather than reflect the America of Tocquevillian myth –
where civil society is a neutral terrain of interaction in which an equal citizenry can
associate  freely  –  efforts  to  form  unions,  cooperatives,  and  other  popular  social
infrastructure demonstrated how capitalist society is stratified by the unequal effects
of  equal  rights,  with  profound  consequences  for  how  different  social  groups  can
organize and which organizations can gain effective power. Generic commitments to
property  rights  protected  capital  accumulation  for  the  few  and  enforced  wage-
dependence for the many, ensuring that even labor’s basic associational rights could
only be the outcome of often violent struggles.4 
9 By the  time of  The  Public  and  its  Problems  Dewey also  abandoned the  idea  that  the
obstacles to democratization revolved around the persistence of status and privilege.
Instead, they revolved around how the associational fabric of society was predicated
upon a deeply unequal distribution of social and political power that was itself a result
of dynamics set in motion during the late 18th century revolutions. These inequalities
ensured  that  the  state  would  be  controlled  not  by  an  “inclusive  and  fraternally
associated public,” but by the leaders of society’s major economic institutions. As he
wrote, “The forms of associated action characteristic of the present economic order are
so massive and extensive that they determine the most significant constituents of the
public and the residence of power. Inevitably they reach out to grasp the agencies of
government;  they are controlling factors in legislation and administration” (Dewey,
2012:  100,  99).  As  Dewey elaborated further,  “The same forces  which have brought
about  the  forms  of  democratic  government,  general  suffrage,  executives  and
legislatives chosen by majority vote, have also brought about conditions which halt the
social and humane ideals that demand the utilization of government as the genuine
instrumentality of an inclusive and fraternally associated public” (ibid.: 100). Only by
constituting itself as a collective actor in its own right could the public develop the
countervailing power to alter these dynamics and lay claim to the political agencies
that governed in its name. 
Pragmatism, Social Democracy, and the Politics of Democratic Association
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XII-1 | 2020
4
10 If social democracy’s main adversaries are inequalities rooted fundamentally in pre-
democratic forms of status hierarchy, it is hard to see how the distinctive problem of
private capital’s integration with the democratic state arises, and it is equally hard to
see  how  democratic  critics  would  grapple  with  the  consequences  of  social
arrangements  where  inequalities  that  impede  free  association  –  like  those  that
empower  capital  to  disorganize,  intimidate,  and  suppress  labor  –  occur  between
citizens with no distinction in their formal status. On the other hand, if we take the
problems raised by capitalism as central to democratic modernity – and perhaps more
salient for social democracy than the persistence of the ancien régime – we confront a
series of unavoidable questions that have structured experiences of social democratic
politics  for  generations,  but  that  are  a  minor  theme  of  Frega’s  account.  How  can
workers develop their political capacities within labor unions? How we integrate these
organizations (alongside community groups and other institutions in civil society) into
political parties that can contest the power that capital exercises over the state? 
 
Relational Equality
11 If social democracy’s main obstacles are forms of status hierarchy that impede equal
individuals’ ability to associate freely, our positive vision of democratic association will
reflect an effort to negate these specific wrongs. While the normative principles that
shape Frega’s account of democratic association – relational parity, inclusive authority,
and social involvement – all reflect this specific critical focus, they also open onto more
radical possibilities that have the potential to both deepen and sharpen Frega’s account
of  relational  equality.  The  ideal  of  democratic  association  that  emerges  from  this
historical  diagnosis  conveys an image that  is  compelling but  unstable,  with critical
purchase on contemporary politics that is apparent, but often diffuse. Again, we can
appeal  to  a  few aspects  of  Dewey’s  philosophical  worldview that  appear  in  Frega’s
account, but could do more to structure it. Taking in their full meaning demonstrates
why relational equality requires a positive account of agential equality that strives to
universalize experiences of intelligent self-direction and creative expression. 
12 In his formal discussion of the normative criteria that shape democratic association,
Frega  claims  that  “Relational  parity  obtains  when  an  individual’s  position  within  a
relation and the specific content of that relation do not depend on one’s social status.
For example, when the status of a citizen depends upon one’s economic standing, or
when authority in a relation depends upon gender or race, the principle of relational
parity is violated […] What matters most for relational parity, therefore, is not what
one  has,  but  how  one  is  treated”  (Frega  2019:  80-1).  The  next  criterion,  inclusive
authority,  demands  that  “individuals  be  the  authors  of  the  decisions  whose
consequences  they  will  undergo,”  and  animates  a  call  for  the  democratization  of
hierarchy  by  fostering  participation  in  decision-making  and  cultivating  legitimacy
between leaders  and led  in  a  variety  of  social  institutions  (ibid.:  82).  Finally,  social
involvement refers to “the effective, material inclusion in the concrete activities of a
community”  which  implies  “residential  integration,  equal  opportunities  in  schools,
meaningful and sufficiently creative jobs, and moderate economic inequality” so as to
create the “experience of belonging to the same social world and having a significant
position within it” (ibid.: 83). 
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13 On the one hand, Frega’s three principles all appear to refuse a radical conception of
equality that would cast suspicion on all forms of inequality. Instead, they often rest on
the hope that those who are unequal can nevertheless meet on a plane of equality. The
result  is  that  while  egalitarianism  is  at  the  core  of  Frega’s  account  of  democratic
association,  his  argument  for  egalitarianism  always  proceeds  by  making  space  for
inequality. For instance, those with different (and by implication, unequal) “economic
standing” should not have their “status” as citizens compromised by that inequality, a
claim  that  seeks  to  mute  the  social  and  political  effects  of  inequality  rather  than
overcome it. Inclusive authority does not simply account for dynamics of leadership in
democratic  organizations,  and  instead  rests  on  an  explicit  defense  of  hierarchy,
understood  to  be  “to  a  certain  extent,  unavoidable  in  social  relations”  (ibid.:  82).
Reflecting the ambition to undo the effects of status, social involvement is frequently
discussed in  purely  negative  terms –  as  a  demand for  the abolition of  obstacles  to
voluntary association rooted in discrimination and social  seclusion – even if  it  also
elaborated in positive terms as cooperative problem-solving among equal participants
in inquiry. The former, constrained view predominates in Frega’s technical definition,
where social involvement demands that one’s position in society is “significant,” rather
than equal.  It  asks  for  a  society  where  we  all  in  some sense  belong,  but  does  not
demand that society belongs equally to all of us. 
14 At the same time, many of Frega’s ambitions appear to push beyond these restrictions,
especially when he moves beyond negative formulations of their meaning. When Frega
discusses how social involvement implies joint-problem solving within a community of
equals – an associational experience akin to the process of scientific inquiry – he is
pointing toward a form of social relation where involvement is more than significant,
but substantively equal. In Dewey’s Lectures in Social and Political Philosophy, he defined
the problem of social democracy in a way that reflects the specific nature of his own
radical  egalitarianism:  “This  basic  problem  of  industrial  society  is  to  establish
conditions that will place all men in their labor on the plane which the small class of
scientists and artists now occupy. Then there will be a real consummation of social life
in full freedom. There will [be] a true social democracy” (Dewey 2015: 94).  Implicit in
this  hope  is  more  than  we  find  in  Mary  Parker  Follett’s  theory  of  “integrative
management,”  but  the  radical  aspiration  to  universalize  experiences  of  agential
capacity at all levels of society. As Frega is well aware, Dewey’s egalitarianism is a core
component  of  his  social  epistemology.  Dewey  argued  that  since  each  person’s
perspective on the associational experience is presumed to have equal validity, the only
way to arrive at an actionable hypothesis among competing agendas is to engage in a
process of inquiry in which all claims are effectively integrated. Here, there is clear
resonance with Follett’s arguments. At the same time, Dewey’s aspiration to elevate the
epistemic and creative experience of labor go far beyond the hope for a more inclusive
managerialism. Instead, they point toward a society where workplaces are organized as
experimental  laboratories  where  the  division  of  labor  is  functional  rather  than
hierarchical, ensuring that all members are given an equal opportunity to creatively
resolve problems, shape their joint activity, and benefit fully from the fruits of their
labor.  Can  such  an  aspiration  be  realized  in  a  society  where  workplaces  are
fundamentally organized as sites for the accumulation of private capital? If it cannot,
one can hardly perceive a difference between Dewey’s  aspirations and those of  the
Socialist Party of America’s presidential candidate Eugene Debs, who hoped that with
the achievement of a truly democratic society, “The industrial dungeon will become a
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temple  of  science”  (Debs  1948:  241).  Approaching  this  ideal  not  only  requires  an
unambiguous defense of our equal epistemic and creative capacities, but a conception
of  distributive  justice  that  equitably  shares  the burdens of  social  reproduction and
clarifies how distributive and relational equality can work in tandem. 
 
The Search for the Public
15 A cardinal component of pragmatism is that the normative ideals that shape the ends
of our action cannot be conceived as independent from the means for their realization.
Viewed from a comprehensive perspective, ends and means are not distinct, but parts
of a continuous process of agency in which each advance re-shapes the terrain of action
and opens new possibilities. Far from a kind of hard realism that counsels rebuking
robust ideals for the sake of a narrow focus on the short-term, Deweyan pragmatism
only demands that our ideals are rooted in the possibilities revealed by experience. In
Human Nature and Conduct, for instance, Dewey cautioned specifically against positing
ends that fail to inhere in present possibilities. As he put it, “The “idealist” sets up as
the ideal not fullness of meaning of the present but a remote goal. Hence the present is
evacuated of meaning. It is reduced to being a mere instrument, an evil necessity due to
the distance between us and significant valid satisfaction” (Dewey 1930 [1922]: 274). In
his view, democratic progress should express something of the “fullness of meaning”
that inheres in experiences of shared agential capacity, and his account of democratic
political transformation was based in the hope that these experiences can proliferate as
they  re-shape  the  political  organizations  responsible  for  steering  and  managing  a
complex modern society. 
16 At a fundamental level, Dewey understands enhancing democratic agency as an effort
to transform social intelligence: how it is generated, directed, and made effective. In
Dewey’s  view,  intelligence  is  “a  short-hand designation for  great  and ever-growing
methods of observation, experiment and reflective reasoning which have in very short
time  revolutionized  the  physical  and,  to  a  considerable  degree,  the  physiological
conditions  of  life”  (Dewey  2004  [1948]:  v).  As  an  inherently  social  and  collective
capacity, intelligence is bound up not only in the worldviews of society’s members, but
in the formation of their collective habits and agential possibilities. Intelligence and its
attendant  phenomena –  reflexivity,  problem-solving,  experimental  exploration,  and
personal growth – reflect the structure of effective human learning, and they permeate
any  society,  democratic  or  otherwise.  The  ambition  of  Dewey’s  “democratic
experimentalism,” therefore, is not to simply use democratic politics for the purposes
of experimental  exploration,  but more radically to transform the very associational
fabric of society by making the structure of all experimental learning more democratic.
Frega’s exposition of this component of Dewey’s philosophy insightfully notes that the
democratic  method,  “does not consist  in treating society as  a  place for naturalistic
experiments or for sophisticated institutional engineering, but rather in identifying the
conditions under which the knowledge producing capacities and the learning potential
which is already implicit in social life can be enhanced” (Frega 2019: 284).
17 By the late 1920’s, Dewey came to describe this process as the public’s self-discovery. As
Frega  explains,  in  an  era  when  the  demos of  modern  nation  states  came  to  be
understood  more  and  more  through  the  metaphor  of  a  crowd,  Dewey  and  other
pragmatists  insisted  that  self-aware  publics  could  still  discover  their  capacities  for
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intelligent  collective  action  in  new  social  conditions.  In  Dewey’s  view,  the  public’s
eclipse was not the inevitable result of complexity or technological change, but a result
of how the forms of social intelligence upon which public consciousness were built –
“our enormous natural resources, our vast machinery of production and distribution,
and  the  wonderful  technical  skill  the  country  possesses”  –  had  emerged  without
corresponding political agencies that could subject them to the cooperative control of a
self-governing  community.  While  social  intelligence  has  proliferated,  it  is  not  only
internally disorganized, but it has no higher-level steering agencies to help coordinate
its  actions,  preventing  the  public  from  exercising  regulatory  control  over  the
consequences of its own activity. What Dewey understood as the public’s self-discovery
therefore  required  both  a  social  and  political  aspect:  organizations  that  inculcated
democratic habits needed to proliferate, but they also needed to develop the power to
exercise control over the state, which meant wresting control away from the powers
that not only utilized it for their narrow self-interest, but whose power contributed to
the  very  disorganization  of  the  public  itself.  A  key  question  then  emerges:  what
precisely are the agencies that can allow the public to discover its capacities and act
upon them intelligently? 
18 In his most thorough discussion of contemporary politics, Frega argues that new, trans-
national  publics  can  emerge  through  the  agency  of  “norm  entrepreneurs”  like
environmentally conscious certification agencies, which spread information, re-shape
consumer practices, and advance a policy agenda that transcends the boundaries of
national public spheres. He praises entrepreneurial authority because, “its legitimacy
relies on purely social sources. It does not derive from processes of delegation of state
authority but is based only on freely obtained consent” by consumers in the market
(Frega 2019: 387). Frega’s emphasis on private volition resonates with some aspects of
Dewey’s worldview, but it ultimately fails to account for the depth of the problem of
the public’s eclipse, either in Dewey’s time or in ours. By doing so, Frega misses the
opportunity  to  demonstrate  the  continuities between  Dewey’s  problems  and  ours,
which should focus our attention on the difficult but urgent task of re-building the
political parties that once served as large-scale institutions of democratic participation
and collective agency. 
19 Dewey might have written in his early essay on democracy that “The democratic ideal
includes liberty, because democracy without initiation from within, without an ideal
chosen from within and freely followed from within, is nothing,” (Dewey 1969: 245), but
he did not argue that the public could be formed by the purely voluntarist strategies of
obtaining  individual  consent,  either  in  the  market  or  through  public  deliberation
through the national media. The public needed agencies that were willing to intervene
meaningfully  within  society,  re-shaping  its  practices  in  order  to  facilitate
democratization.  In  fact,  Dewey’s  mature  political  writings  criticized  the  liberal
individualist idealization of private volition quite radically, since he recognized that
from  its  standpoint,  any  structural  social  change  would  be  viewed  as  a  suspect
infringement on the possibilities of private choice. His rejection of this view went so far
as to suggest that its widespread adoption undermined social progress itself, given “its
denial (more often implicit than express) of the possibility of radical intervention of
intelligence in the conduct of human life” (Dewey 1960: 78). 
20 While The Public and its Problems did not account for the specific institutional ecosystem
that  could  support  the  public’s  self-discovery,  Dewey’s  own  political  actions  in
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subsequent years illustrate the kinds of changes that he believed were necessary to
advance this goal. In the midst of the Great Depression, Dewey began to advocate the
formation of a new political party that would put forward “a new conception of politics,
a new conception of government, and of the relation of the government to the people
in  this  country”  (Dewey  1987:  276).  A  new  party  would  refuse  the  parameters  of
established  party’s  rhetoric,  influence  networks,  and  habitual  forms  of  political
competition. Instead, it would gather together a plurality of popular organizations and
direct their focus not simply to internal self-organization, but to external conflict with
political opponents. During this time, Dewey studied the history of third-party farmer/
labor organizations, taking on their failures as a problem to be resolved in its own right
(Dewey 1985: 238). His ambition was not simply to federate democratic organizations,
but to organize them for victories over adversaries, both within and outside the formal
institutions of liberal democracy. For these tasks, a theory of democratic association
needs to integrate the dimension of political conflict, including for moments when an
“integrative” solution is not politically appropriate. With no coherent, nationally and
internationally recognized bearer of a social democratic way of life, embodied in an
organization  that  maintains  an  ideological  distinction  with  competing  parties,
intervenes in society, and maintains a willingness to coerce its adversaries, the public’s
search  for  its  agential  capacities  will  proceeds  unfocused,  divided,  and  ultimately
eclipsed by its well-organized, well-financed, and self-interested opponents.
 
Democracy’s Future
21 An  important  part  of  Frega’s  intervention  is  that  it  resists  a  tendency  in  critical
thought to see the democratic era as already eclipsed. Wolfgang Streeck, for instance,
argues that contemporary hopes for a more democratic future “presupposes a degree
of political control over our common fate of which we cannot even dream after the
destruction of collective agency, and even the hope for it, in the neoliberal-globalist
revolution.” (Streeck 2014: 46). Frega’s argument can help us see how these forms of
intellectual pessimism rest on mistaken views about democratic collective action. Just
like Dewey argued with the advent of “mass society” reclaiming our agential capacities
is an omnipresent possibility for social collectives willing to struggle for more shared
control over their common fate. In these processes, we should reject the inegalitarian
heritage that has dominated Western political thought in all of its guises, using own
experiences of  what it  means to be free and equal  with others as  a  motivation for
action, and the germ of a democratic ideal worth fighting for. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY
DEBS Eugene, (1948), “Industrial Unionism,” in Arthur Schlesinger (ed.), Writings and Speeches of
Eugene V. Debs, New York, Heritage Press.
Pragmatism, Social Democracy, and the Politics of Democratic Association
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XII-1 | 2020
9
DEWEY John, (1930 [1922]), Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology, New York,
The Modern Library.
DEWEY John, (2004 [1948]), Reconstruction in Philosophy, Mineola, Dover Publications.
DEWEY John, (1960), A Common Faith, New Haven, Yale University Press.
DEWEY John, (1969), “The Ethics of Democracy,” The Early Works, 1882-1898, Volume 1: Early Essays
and Leibniz’s New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding, Carbondale, Southern Illinois
University Press.
DEWEY John, (1985), “The Place of Minor Parties in the American Scene,” The Later Works, 1925-1935,
Volume 6: 1931-1932, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press. 
DEWEY John, (1987), Later Works, 1925-1937, Volume 11: 1935-1937, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, Carbondale,
Southern Illinois University Press.
DEWEY John, (2012), The Public and its Problems: An Essay in Political Inquiry, University Park, The
Pennsylvania State University Press.
DEWEY John, (2015), “Lectures in Social and Political Philosophy,” European Journal of Pragmatism
and American Philosophy, 7 (2) [journals.openedition.org/ejpap/404].
FREGA Roberto, (2019), Pragmatism and the Wide View of Democracy, Palgrave MacMillan. 
FINE Nathan, (1929), Labor and Farmer Parties in the United States, 1828-1928, Berkeley, Center for
Socialist History.
GOUREVITCH Alex, (2012), From Slavery to the Cooperative Commonwealth: Labor and Republican Liberty
in the 19th Century, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
MONTGOMERY David, (1981 [1967]), Beyond Equality: Labor and the Radical Republicans, 1862-1872, New
York, Alfred P. Knopf.
PRZEWORSKI Adam, (1985), Capitalism and Social Democracy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
STREECK Wolfgang, (2014), “How Will Capitalism End?,” New Left Review, 87, May/June.
NOTES
1. See, for example, Przeworski (1985). 
2. On the Knights of Labor see Gourevitch (2012). 
3. See Fine (1929).
4. For an insightful historical account of labor’s efforts to wrestle with these theoretical and
practical issues, see Montgomery (1981 [1967]).
Pragmatism, Social Democracy, and the Politics of Democratic Association




Hobart and William Smith Colleges
quish[at]hws.edu
Pragmatism, Social Democracy, and the Politics of Democratic Association
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XII-1 | 2020
11
